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Contemporary society finds itself besieged by problems which many
times can be solved in the same manner, wherever they may arise, indepen-
dent of any circumstances of place and time; but national divisions and
age-old prejudices have produced different ways of dealing with the same
matter, and consequently, different solutions. These latter, considering
how similar the problems are that determine them, usually do not differ
greatly; but their characteristics, arising from differences in time and place,
present certain elements which may cause the superficial observer to believe
the problems and their solution to be radically different.
Between an institution of Cuban law
matrimony by equiparacion) and the other in
law marriage) we find numerous points of




A journey to the beautiful City of Miami, while participating in
the exchange program of professors between the Universities of Havana
and Miami, gave me the opportunity of augmenting my materials on
common law marriage. Thmere I prepared this article which I dedicate,
in gratitude, to the School of Law of the University of Miami, where I
was received with an affection and benevolence which I shall never forget.
*Professor of Law, University of Havana School of Law.
The author is indebted to Win. R. Pierce, graduate student, School of Law,
University of Miami, for the translation.
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1. THE CoNINIoN LAw MARRIAGE.
Brocklebank' points out, discussing the origins of the common law
marriage in the United States, that until the Council of Trent, Canon
Law had followed the consensual theor, of matrimony. The Council of
Trent added to the consent of the parties a requirement of form or
solemnization. While England had embraced the Reformation before
this Council, the new regulation was not adopted by the Church of Eng-
land, but instead, the traditional consensual theory was continued until
1753, when, in Lord Hardwicke's Act, the traditional rule of informality
was replaced by the requirement of a religious ceremony. In the American
Colonies, there were many laws of the Colonial Assemblics relating to
matrimony and its forms, but none expressly abolished the common law
marriage. The traditional principle of informal consent remained, appar-
ently not affected by any statute. Brocklebank points out that an important
work of a somewhat later period, Kent's Commentaries (1827), defends
the validity of the common law marriage. Another authoritative treatise,
Greenleaf Ott Evidence (1842), reaffirms Kent's approval of the institution.
Finally, in the celebrated case, Meister v. Moore' the United States
Supreme Court decided in favor of the common law marriage, which is
now a fully recognized legal institution where it remains in force.
Meanwhile, several states enacted laws in derogation of the Common
Law, providing that only a cercmonial marriage be valid. In other states,
such as Louisiana, the common law marriage never was engrafted into
the local law.3 The attitude of the courts has also varied. First the common
law marriage was freely accepted. By degrees this anomalous form of
matrinony was subjected to increasingly strict scrutiny, reaching the point
where it could be stated that courts "do not regard this form of marriage
with favor." 4 This trend of judicial authority in the United States which
is opposed to common law marriage establishes the most important distinc-
tion between Cuban law and American law.
Elements. The law has always considered common law marriage as
a degenerate type of matrimony because of its lack of form. The funda-
mental element is always the agreement of the parties. As an echo of
the timeless maxim consensus facit nuptias, we encounter the rule that
"there should be an actual and mutual agreement to enter a matrimonial
relation."'
I. BICKEH .NK, La Formation du Marriage Dans le Droit des Etats Unis, 247
(1935 Ed.); COAt' & CAPIrrANT, Cours Elementaire de Droit Civil Francais, 122 (1927);
I Essnw, Le Marriage en Droit Canonique (1929); MADDEN & COmPTON, Cases and
Materials on Domestic Relations (1940); NtcCuuny, Cases on the Law of Persons and
Domestic Relations (1939),
2. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78 (1877).
3. 55 C. J. S., MARRIACE §6.
4. Id. at 818.
5. Ibid.
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This agreement must be reached by parties legally capable of carrying
out their marriage contract; and the agreement must be consummated
either by cohabitation as husband and wife or by the "mutual assumption
of marital duties and obligations."6 The most important additional factor
is, however, that no solemnization or form is required. "The consent
of the parties to the common law marriage must be mutual and must
include, as an element, the intention to enter into a marital relation, but
no particuiar form or manifestation of consent is essential.,"7 In some
cases, a private instrument has been utilized to set forth the agreement
of the parties to be husband and wife, one party executing it in a state
where common law marriage is valid, and sending a copy to the other
party." In one case, an army officer, on learning of the birth of a child,
asked the mother to obtain her parents' permission to marry. He prepared
and signed a matrimonial agreement, sending two copies to the woman.
She executed them and returned them to him. Although there was no
subsequent consummation of the agreement by cohabitation the court held
there was a common law marriage.9 In another case, in which the parties
agreed "to live as husband and wife until . . . lawfully married," the court
found no common law marriage because no present intent to marry was
shown.10
In general, proof of the parties' consent must be unequivocal, although
no special formal requirements exist. The evidence may be written, oral
or even based on conduct alone." Cohabitation has been held by courts
'to be "only an element of a common law marriage." The rule has been
applied "even though the cohabitation is apparently decent and orderly."' 2
"Cohabitation, general repute, and holding out do not make a marriage,
and are not a substitute for a marriage,"' 3 since consent to establish
a marital community is lacking. The parties must be of legal age and
capacity so as to enable them to give their consent. A minor may be
capable if permission or authorization of the parent is obtained. In
accordance with common law rule persons under the age of seven have
6. Id. at 819.
7. Id. at 841.
8. Great Northern Railway Co. v. johnson, C.C.A.N.D,, 254 F. 683, MCCuDY,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 93-95 (especially notes ivi).
9. Commonwealth v. Amann, 58 Pa. Dist. & Co., 669. 95 PITT. LEO. J. 195.
10. State v. Crimes, 215 Iowa 1287, 247 NA. 664.
11. 55 C. J. S. MARRIAGE §19; many California, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Texas decisions are cited. MCCuRDY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 95 and 96
(note 4).
12. Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Billberg, Tex. Civ. App, 172, S.W.2d 157;
Zy v. Zy, 13 N.Y.S.2d 415.
13. In re O'Neill's Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d 714, 184 Misc. 832! Taegen v. Taegen,
61 N.Y.S.2d 869; Rodman v. Rodman, 140 Misc. 642; 251 N.Y.S. 270, MADDEN,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 64 (notes 1 and 2); MCCURDY, op. Cit. supra, at 95 (notes
2 and 3).
AII1AM! LAW OUAITERLY
no capacity to enter a common law marriage. From that age to tile normal
age of consent, any act beyond such capacity is subject to annulnent.
4
Should any one of the rcquirements of common law marriage be
lacking, especially the proof that there was an agreement to enter into
the relation of husband and wife, the union is regarded as "merely
meretricious" and ". . . not a marriage.'"-
Effects. It is in this regard that the most interesting aspect of a
common law marriage becomes apparent. It must be bornei in mind that,
at all time, we arc dcaling with a type of marriage, not with something
lesser than a marriage which must be elevated in some fashion to that
category. The entire history and growth of common law marriage show
this to be true. Formless it may be, nevertheless the agreement of the
parties establishes a true marriage, not some other type of union.
"Wherever it is recognized, the common law marriage is as valid
as a ceremonial marriage, and a subsequent denial of the former by the
parties thereto would no more destroy its validity, than would the repudia-
tion by the parties to the latter change or effect the status created by it."I
IT. MATRIMONY BY EQUIPARACION"
7
The requirement of religious marriage according to the Spanish Civil
Code which, with some amendments, is still in force, obtained in Cuba
until 1918 when "civil marriage", ceremonial marriage performed by a
judge or a notary, was introduced as the exclusive form. Other types of
unions between man and wife were not recognized by the Code and, con-
sequently, no rights or duties based on the status were created between
such parties. This rigid rule, in many instances, caused severe injustice
in that, frequently, a man and woman, having lived in a "marriage-like
community" all their lives, would find that on the death of one of them,
all property would pass to distant relatives of the decedent leaving the
survivor and any children nothing.' 8
In 1940 the Constitution (Art. 43 paragraph 6) introduced the following
provision:
14. 55 C. J. S. Marriage §11, 1. Esincin, op. cit. su~ra note 1 at 166, concerning
this requirement of seven years of age to enter into a contract or agreement of
betrothal (desponsatio).
15. 55 CORPUS JURIS SIcVINOuM 819 and 850.
16. Id. at 817, in fine. There remains the problem, which must be noted, of the
availability of the common law marriage where the initial relationship is meretricious,
but later ripens into, what the parties allege to be a nouineretricious union.
17. "Equiparacion" means equalizing, i.e., granting identical effects. Alternative
terminology used for the verb "equiparar" is "to convert". (Note by translator).
18. Notarial marriage was established in 1929 by the Notarial Code. Concerning
certain effects of de facto unions, our decisions with various criteria have admitted
their efficacy in creating "associations de facto" in the case of concubinage, in order
that property gained in such cases may be divided; also this situation is taken into
account in investigations of paternity in matters of bastardy.
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The courts shall have authority to declare, where equitable reasons
compel such a result, that a monogamic'" and stable union between
persons with legal capacity to marry is equivalent to a civil
marriage.
In this way, the Cuban Constitution dealt with the problem posed
by such marriagc-like communities existing on the very margin of the law.
Persons who qualify under this constitutional provision will not be con-
sidered, in the eyes of the law, to be living in concubinage or some other
inferior form of union, They are not merely endowed with certain rights:
by force of law and the necessary decision of the court such unions become
the same as normal marriages, not more, nor less. In truth, the only thing
lacking in this type of union is the initial intent to "celebrate" a formal
marriage. If the case before the court meets the requirements as estab-
lished by Art. 43 of the Constitution, there is no doubt that the parties
have "worked" at the marriage day by day far more than any couple who,
although married before a judge or notary, separate a short time later,
probably never to see each other again.
Elements. The requirement sine qua non of an "anomalous mar-
riage" 20 is the decision of a competent court, declaring such union "con-
verted" into the equivalent of a normal ceremonial marriage. The acts of
the parties alone have no legal effect, nor can they give rise to any legal
claim; in all cases the decision of tle court, rendering its judgment of
equalization, is indispensable. Consequently, it may be stated that this
decision creates rather than declares a status. And the court will give
such a judgment only if it finds the necessary equitable grounds, that is,
of justice and morality, in addition to the required factual circumstances.
This equitable basis is the most helpful guide to the judge in making his
determination and also allows him to make a flexible interpretation of the
other statutory requirements.2 1 Flexibility is not arbitrariness, nor discretion
license. There are always limitations on what the judge may freely decide.
The sum of the considerations of morality, justice, plus the will to aid
those whose need is the greatest (the true act of mercy as Ferrara defines
it) marks the outer limit of judicial liberty.
First of all the union must have existed, but no rigid standards may
be set up regarding its external manifestation. The couple may have kept
house together. Generally this is the case but it is not necessary. They
19. The term "singularidad" could also be said to have the meaning of "unique"
but it is here translated as monogamic to show clearly the intent not to establish another
relationship of the same quality. That it does not refer merely to lack of promiscuity,
see below sub nornine. (Note by translator)
20. The terminology is mine, in my book, Anomalous (Equivalent) Marriage (1942).
21. Case decided by Judge Dr. Valle More, 6 Sept. (1944); the man and the
woman were single, they had lived together many years, they were not united with
anyone else . . . but the woman lived a life of sin with the approval of the man,
who enjoyed the earnings of her "profession" (!). The judge dismissed the case "for
lack of any reason of equity".
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may or may not have had children. The man may or may not have
supported the woman, Normally the union would be open with the
holding out, the reputation in the community, the nomen, tractatus, fama
of being spouses. But even a completely secret union can be "converted".
In summary, nothing more is required of a "convertible" union than is
required of an ordinary marriage.
The legal capacity of the parties involved in this type of union is the
ordinary capacity required by the Civil Code (Arts. 83 and 84) for cere-
monial marriages. Since many of the requirements of that type of capacity
are merely reasons for annulment operating after the event, they become,
to that extent, inapplicable to this institution. It suffices, therefore, that,
for a union to be "converted", the parties be not related within the
prohibited degrees, that they be not already married (the union would
be adulterous) and that they be not of insufficient age (below twelve
for a woman and fourteen for a man). In my opinion no other defects
stemming from lack of capacity exist.
22
The determination of the element of stability is left to the judge.
This will vary according to the particular equities of the case. For instance,
if the union was dissolved by death, a shorter period of living together
will suffice. However, stability must not be construed to mean "perma-
nence" or "continuity". It may even happen, that the union was stable
at one time, and now it no longer exists; nevertheless the petition for
an equalizing declaration may be successful except where there are grounds
for fraud on the court.
"Singleness" 23 is defined in a negative manner; it is the absence of
another union of the same dignity. The best way to prove that the union
should not be "converted" would be to show that another union existed
simultaneously. It is also necessary to stress the distinction between the
lack of monagainic quality and infidelity by way of incidental promiscuity.
The former presupposes proof of another stable union, while in case of
the latter it could easily be shown that no stable relationship was created
to replace the one already existing. Were this distinction not preserved,
infidelity could be alleged, even falsly, to bar a valid "equiparaci6n".
The decision granting equivalency has retroactive effect. Therefore
the decision must state the date from which the union is declared equivalent
to marriage (it may be the date of its commencement), and the date it
ended (if one of the parties has died or married a third person); or that
the union still continues at the time of the demand for declaration. In
22. Decisions: No. 86, April 1, 1949, and No. 254, November 16, 1949, both
of the Supreme Court. They set forth an exaggerated theory, which requires proof of
the absence of "all impediments" Montagu, Perera, and Bru, JJ. dissented, as they
considered that "it was not logical to impose a greater burden of proof on a free
union between a man and woman" than was demanded in the case of an ordinary
marriage.
23. For an explanation of the other meaning assigned this term see note 19 supra.
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this case, the decree of equivalency will convert the union into a continuing
marriage, which like any other marriage, is, in my opinion, subject to dis-
solution only by divorce or death.
The action at law to have such a union, meeting the requirements
discussed above, declared equivalent to a marriage falls within the class
of "status actions". In all such actions notice to intervene must be given
the Attorney General's Office (Ministerio Fiscal) in order that the public
interest be properly represented. The procedure is the same as that
governing declaratory judgments in major claims (as distinguished from
small claims) which is the most complete set of procedural safeguards
established by our Code of Civil Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil).
The effects of the judgment are that, during the entire period for
which the formerly voluntary union has been declared to be equivalent
to marriage, the same rights and obligations arise without limitation just
as if there had been a true marriage ab initio. The text of the Constitution
says "to make equivalent" and this, in my opinion, shuts the door on any
attempt to introduce limitations, other than those envisaged in express
statutory provisions. For example, if property, acquired during the "mar-
riage", is sold prior to the decree, no retroactivity can divest rights of the
third persons who, in good faith, acquired the property from one who was
legally "single" at that time.
Our Supreme Court has passed on many aspects of this institution.
Its decisions may be consulted in "La Jurisprudencia al Dia."24 It may also
be added here that recent social security laws, both for professional persons
and workmen, expressly recognize the rights arising from such judgments
of equivalency. 25 In addition, in examining the field of comparative law,
we find that this institution has already been adopted in several Latin
American countries. This ready acceptance indicates a possibility of even
greater utility in solving a difficult sociological problem in an even broader
territorial sphere.26
24. The first was No. 45, of April 9, 1945. No. 57 of May 2, 1945 established
the rule that in order for a union to be declared equivalent, it must have lasted until
10 October, 1940, when the Constitution came into effect; those abandoned before
could not be rendered equivalent. No. 17 of February 12, 1946, treats of the necessary
age and states that parental consent is not required. No. 124, of May 23, 1950 resolves
in the negative a case in which, besides the union that was alleged, the concubine had
had another of equal importance; therefore, there was no "singleness", as the two
unions were simultaneous. No. 129, of November 17, 1952, applies this institution to
non-Cubans, for reasons of public order. There were many other cases before our
Supreme Court, but I cite only some, for their importance
25. The laws establishing "Social Security for Lawyers", "Social Security for
Congressmen", "Druggists' Retirement", "Professional Social Security for Newspaper-
men", that of Customhouse Brokers, that of Textile Workers, that of Workmen and
Laborers employed by the State and others.
26. Panama Const,, Art. 56; Guatemala Const. Art. 74; Bolivia Constitution,
art. 131. Those of Chile and Ecuador, a Decree of 1945 in Paraguay, and many more.
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II. CONCLUSION
It is easily seen that there are similarities and, at the same time, differ-
ences between the two legal concepts that we have briefly examined,
namely between the common law marriage and the matrimony "por
cquiparaci6n".
Both arc intended as a solution to cases where two persons have lived
together like spouses without the marriage-creating ceremony, and for one
reason or another, claims arise which descrve to be dealt with in a just
manner. The starting point from which, on the one hand, the common
law marriage arises, and on the other hand, the equalized matrimony is
declared, is different; (a) in the first, it is the intent to marry, the formal
manifestation, i.e., the celebration that is omitted; (b) in the latter, the
only important thing is the fact that the union has really cxistcl,' regardless
of whether there was any initial intent to establish a unit. Therefore,
the Common Law looks for a clear agreement, or its equivalent, to unite
people in a life of marital community; in case of equiparaci6n, a contrary
intent, even if clearly demonstrated (perhaps by a signed document), is
of no importance, since the union will be equalizcd in spite of such fact.
In the case of cquiparaci6n a valid judicial decision is necessary
before any other rights, similar to those arising from a true marriage, may
be claimed since without such a decision the mion has no legal effect.
In the case of a common law marriage, acts alone constitute a common
law marriage, and the decision of the court, if any, is only declaratory,
since this status arises from intention and agreement, express or tacit,
to live as husband and wife.
What is certain is that, in a majority of cases, in common as well
as Cuban law in regard to such anomalous marriages, what is necessary is
something distinct from marriage. However, it is apparent that Cuban
law relies more on the merc acts, without investigating the intent, while
the Anglo-American law in determining a case of common law marriage
relies upon the intent, interpreting the facts with considerable liberality in
order to recognize common law marriages in situations where the intent
was not clearly manifested. As far as the underlying legal policies are
concerned, there is indeed an apparent divergence between the two
systems. The Cuban system grants greater protection to persons who
would be victims of their own legal neglect; the Common Law-so it
seems-tries onl the contrary to push this anomalous concept over to one
side and, in a somewhat contradictory manner, makes it more flexible
and of greater practical value. In Anglo-American law, the historical
origins of common law marriage demanded the fundamental requirement
of agreement; hut, social needs and a spirit of justice warrant a liberal
interpretation. There the courts are asked not to close their eyes or
fail to apply common sense in an effort to cloak with respectability a
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relationship that is not entitled to that protection;-2 7 and, as a consequence,
numerous laws in manv states 8 have deprived common law marriages
of their original defects. On the other hand, we find a trend toward a
liberal interpretation. This seems to be evidence of the struggle between
the traditional law and the demands for a solution for a free union. The
this reason, also, it has b')en said that general statutes are directive only
and a formal prohibition of the common law marriage is required, which
statute will then be considered in derogation of common law.
If Anglo-American law terminates in total abolition of the common
law marriage and concubinage and irregular unions were not to disappear
completely (a most unlikely thing), then the Anglo-American law would
be in the same state as ours was prior to 1940. The common law marriage
has a long tradition and has shown its usefulness. For this reason it will
probably not be abandoned, but, in any event, both societies, United States
and Cuban, would still be confronted with the phenomenon of voluntan
or free unions. The most serious ones, the true de facto marriages-con-
summated, permanent, partners cleaving to one another, showing the same
degree of stability as ordinary marriage-these unions are born on the
margin of the law, caused by emotional forces stronger than the law, and
whose real juridical nature confuses even the most clear-sighted observer;
and other unions are not quite as solid, but similar in fact, being not
mere temporary unions, contracted from motives of pure pleasure; all
these cases require solutions by the law in Cuba as well as in the United
States. The law in the United States may yet reach across to its Cuban
neighbor for another solution to the problem of the anomalous marriage,
matrimony by equiparaci6n, which might salvage for society some of the
worthwhile voluntary unions not reached by common law marriage.
27. In re O'Neill's Estate, note 13.
28. 55 C. J. S. Marriage §6.
